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Abstract: Sustainable fishery management is a complex multi-sectoral challenge requiring substantial
interagency coordination, collaboration, and knowledge sharing. While scholars of public
management network theory and natural resource management have identified trust as one of
the key ideational network properties that facilitates such interaction, relatively few studies have
operationalized and measured the multiple dimensions of trust and their influence on collaboration.
This article presents the results of an exploratory study examining the Gulf of Mexico fishery
management network comprised of more than 30 stakeholder organizations. Using an empirically
validated survey instrument, the distribution of four types of trust, three gradations of influence, and
the degree of formality and informality in actor communications were assessed across the fishery public
management network. The analysis reveals generally low levels of interorganizational procedural
trust and a high degree of network fragmentation along the international border. Civil servants
based at U.S. organizations reported nearly no interactions with Mexican agencies, and vice versa.
Rational (calculative) trust was the most important in bringing about reported change in other
organizations, while dispositional distrust and affinitive (relational) trust also had significant effects.
The results suggest that, although transactional interorganizational relationships prevail in Gulf of
Mexico fishery governance, well-developed professional relationships contribute meaningfully to
the reported success of public fishery network management and warrants further policy attention in
order to help ensure sustainability.
Keywords: Gulf of Mexico; fishery governance; trust; ecosystem-based management; policy network
1. Introduction
A growing literature in natural resource management (NRM) and public administration focuses
on the importance of trust to collaborative governance. Trust is part of the “groupware” that Agranoff
and McGuire [1] consider important for mutual learning and adaptation among members of a public
management network. It improves information flow and participants’ assessments of the quality of
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management outcomes [2]. It lowers conflict among network members and enhances influence [3,4].
Diffusing trust is one of the defining activities of boundary-spanning network management [5].
Distinguishing among different types of trust, operationalizing them, and highlighting their importance,
is thus a priority topic receiving considerable attention for the management of ecosystems (e.g., [6,7]).
1.1. Interorganizational Trust and Influence in Ecosystem-Based Management
Ecosystem-based management (EBM) is the contemporary approach to environmental
management based on a confluence of advances across disciplines [8,9]. It ontologically presupposes
social-ecological systems as being non-linear and multi-scalar and multi-temporal complex adaptive
systems. The task of EBM—and of public management research on networks more broadly—is to
organize a response to such complex challenges by constituting the response as a complex adaptive
system. Thus, resource management must complexify to match complexity. It must seek to reorient
its complex and diverse elements in accordance with new information so that it is adaptable to the
adapting ecosystem. Trust is understood to facilitate adaptability by increasing the network’s capacity
for managing information, mutually learning, and coordinating. The analogue of ecosystems and
management networks is so evident that, in a recent study on different trust types in NRM, Stern and
Baird [10] referred to their object of investigation as an “ecology of trust” whereby trust facilitates
organizational resilience.
The importance of trust as a key component of network governance and EBM is well established.
In a recent text on EBM, Wondolleck and Yaffee [11] distinguish between the “bricks” (formal
institutions) and “mortar” (ideational network traits) that combine to facilitate successful environmental
management initiatives. Through a series of case studies, they portray trust as central to the mortar
concept. In a recent review of the literature on network analysis and environmental management,
Jurian Edelenbos and Ingmar van Meerkerk [9] (p. 25) indicated that trust “stimulates and consolidates
coordination and interaction between different actors from different domains and organizations in
... water governance networks” with research finding that trust leads to better perceived outcomes
of environmental projects [2]. Similarly, Stern and Baird [10] show that trust enhances the efficacy of
NRM institutions, while more recent research has sought to distinguish between and operationalize
the impact of specific trust types on interorganizational collaboration and behavior change [3,7,12,13].
These studies in NRM and EBM follow more than a decade of public administration research
that has sought to identify the conditions that facilitate network governance and contribute to what
Robert Agranoff [14] (p. 59–60) calls “mutual learning and adaptation”. In a review of the literature by
leading scholars of public administration network theory, the authors indicate that one of the poorly
understood concepts is the role of informal connections, and its relationship with formal relationships
and trust [13]. They lament that “there has been very little advancement of our understanding of
this pervasive mechanism of governance” and that few studies examine informality’s role within
networks [15] (p. 165).
Insufficient attention has also been paid to the measurable outcomes of useful network properties.
Some sort of learning and behavioral change is often proposed, typically in the form of influence [16].
The most well-developed literature on organizational influence is in the international relations subfield,
which has put great attention into the question of organizational effectiveness and influence in the
context of international organizations [17,18]. Yet, influence is also a crucial feature of network
governance since networks have to mutually adapt to evolving knowledge. Particularly useful is
Sikina Jinnah’s [19] framework for predicting and examining international organization secretariat
influence. Because the different kinds of trust require different management approaches to develop,
it is important if they have different types of influence on network participants—be it a change in
available information, behavior, or normative beliefs (see Section 2.1 for details).
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1.2. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
This article examines the presence of trust and its effects on interorganizational influence in a
network of organizations implicated in the governance of fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of
Mexico was chosen because it represents one of North American’s most valuable fishery resources,
with the recreational and commercial fisheries in the U.S. portion alone amounting to 1.7 million jobs
and $212 billion in sales [20]. It is also a complex management challenge because its transnational and
interjurisdictional features require that stakeholders coordinate activities and collaborate to ensure
shared sustainability outcomes. In the United States, marine fishery regulations are developed by the
multi-stakeholder Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (Gulf Council), under the authority
of the U.S. Magnuson–Stevens Act. One federal agency (the National Marine Fishery Service—also
known as NOAA Fisheries) is tasked with overseeing and approving these regulations, but a host of
other federal agencies undertake projects and oversee industries that indirectly impinge on the health
of fishery habitat. Within each state’s seaward limit, their wildlife and fishery agencies exercise a high
degree of regulatory authority. Their activities are partly organized by the Gulf States Marine Fisheries
Commission, whose governance is based on a 1949 compact passed by the U.S. Congress. The Mexican
government’s share of the Gulf Coast is nearly as large as the United States’, although its formal status
in, and capacity for, coordinated regulatory design and enforcement is comparatively lacking.
A pertinent example of the complexity facing the Gulf of Mexico’s fishery management network is
hypoxia, or the ‘dead zone’, which has been occurring for decades. Hypoxia caused by eutrophication
of runoff water from the Mississippi River Basin results in massive areas where marine species are
harmed [21]. Trawling data has shown that the spatial distribution of demersal species suffers from
loss of useable habitat, loss in ecological performance, and often direct mortality [22]. Many of
these demersal species are harvested directly (such as shrimp), but their disturbance also negatively
impacts species that rely on them as a food source. In the case of hypoxia, the Gulf fishery’s habitat is
degraded through the agriculture and water management practices of several states connected to the
Mississippi River drainage basin. Neither NOAA Fisheries, nor any bureau within its parent agency,
the Department of Commerce, have regulatory authority over agriculture and water management,
and here the network must extend to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and other agencies. Thus, the Gulf fishery governance network reaches far into
organizations that are not specifically focused on fishery governance. The complexity of the systems
also requires communication among a diversity of stakeholders that affect the fishery’s resiliency,
diversity, and anthropogenic pressures.
In response to the challenge of governing such complex ecosystems, conservation agencies have
turned toward a management approach that views fisheries through a wider lens [11]. This shift allows
for a more holistic view in which the fish are only one component of a larger, more complex ecosystem.
Furthermore, the Gulf of Mexico is viewed in the scholarly literature as a potentially successful and
emerging case of EBM, thanks to programs pursued through the Gulf of Mexico Alliance, a cooperative
initiative of the U.S. federal government and Gulf states to implement EBM principles in the region [11].
Yet, little or no evidence indicates how well stakeholders mutually learn and adjust in the governance
of the region’s fisheries (i.e., the ‘mortar’ concepts of EBM), nor does it indicate the respective influence
of the various organizations in the process.
1.3. Research Aims
This article aims to understand several important characteristics of the Gulf of Mexico fishery
management network, particularly the presence of, and interactions between, interorganizational trust,
and influence across jurisdictional boundaries. More specifically, the following questions guided the
research:
• What agencies make up the Gulf of Mexico fishery management network?
• How does communication occur between these organizations? With what method and frequency?
Sustainability 2019, 11, 6090 4 of 23
• What is the distribution of trust and influence throughout the resource management network?
• What are the effects of trust and formal and informal communications on
interorganizational influence?
2. Materials and Methods
The research methods consisted of a survey instrument and semi-structured interviews with key
informants. Survey respondents were asked a series of biographical questions, presented with a list
of organizations and asked which ones they communicate with in their work, and were then asked
follow-up questions about those organizations. The follow-up questions resulted in a dataset with a
dyadic respondent-target structure for several of the measured concepts.
2.1. Measuring Trust and Influence
A three-point Likert scale (i.e. ‘never’; ‘occasionally’; and ‘regularly’) measures the frequency
of formal communication (committee meetings, memos, and written business communication) and
informal communication (chance conversations, spontaneous meetings, casual emails, and phone calls)
within the relationships reported by survey participants.
Four dimensions of trust operationalized to suit the interorganizational context roughly follow
Stern and Coleman’s [12] useful typology: dispositional, rational, affinitive, and procedural. Existing
survey question operationalizations of interorganizational affinitive trust and procedural trust have
been developed and employed in Temby et al., [7] and Song et al., [13], as three questions per
trust type. Song et al. [13] used four studies of NRM governance networks to empirically validate
these questions as a two-dimensional psychometric scale focusing on affinitive trust and procedural
trust (Cronbach’s Alpha for affinitive trust, procedural trust and the full scale were 0.570, 0.633,
and 0.656 respectively). Song et al., [3] expanded this to operationalize all four trust types for the
interorganizational context, adding three questions each to measure dispositional trust and rational
trust. The authors added rational trust to the existing psychometric scale and, using a case study of
Great Lakes fishery governance, validated an interorganizational trust scale with three latent constructs
(Cronbach’s Alpha for affinitive trust, procedural trust, rational trust, and the full scale were 0.742,
0.634, 0.687, and 0.799 respectively; the results of structural equation modelling are also available).
Based on these findings, Song et al. [3] (p. 11) “posit[ed] interorganizational trust as a second-order
or macro-level construct of trust composed of three first-order factors – affinitive, procedural and
rational trust, which are positively and significantly correlated”. For the study of the Gulf of Mexico
fishery governance network, Temby et al.’s [7] and Song et al.’s [3] operationalizations of trust are
used, with one exception. Namely, one of the procedural trust questions, “in our experiences with this
organization, we have never had the feeling of being misled”, has been replaced with the following:
“in working with this organization, it is expected that any unfair dealings will be avoided or rectified
by existing regulatory, legal, or reputational measures”. This was done to better clarify the distinction
between the rational trust and procedural trust operationalizations, as recommended in Song et al. [3].
For these questions, participants were asked to what extent they agreed with each statement, answering
using a 1–5 Likert-type scale. Table 1 lists the questions and the corresponding trust type.
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Table 1. Four Dimensions of Trust, Definitions, and Operationalizations (derived from Song et al. [3,13]).
Trust Type Definition Survey Measurement for Interorganizational Context
Dispositional
The general tendency or
predisposition of an individual to
trust or distrust another entity in a
particular context.
• People are almost always interested only in their
own welfare.
• You can’t be too careful dealing with people.
• Most people would try to take advantage of you if
they got the chance.
Rational
Trust in an entity based primarily
on a calculation of the perceived
utility of the expected outcome of
placing one’s trust in another
entity.
• This organization can be relied upon to perform
its objectives.
• In our relationship with this organization, both
sides treat each other in a consistent and
predictable manner.
• Working with this organization can contribute to
our organization’s success.
Affinitive
Trust in an entity based primarily
on the emotions and associated
judgments resulting from either
cognitive or subconscious
assessments of the qualities of the
potential trustee.
• Because we have been working with this
organization for so long, all kinds of procedures
have become self-evident.
• In this relation, informal agreements have the same
significance as formal contracts.
• Because we have been working with this
organization so long, we can understand each other
well and quickly.
Procedural
Trust in procedures or other
systems that decrease
vulnerability of the potential
trustor, enabling action in the
absence of other forms of trust.
• In this relation, both sides are expected not to make
demands that can seriously damage the interests of
the other.
• In our relationship with this organization, the
strongest side is expected not to pursue its interest
at all costs.
• In working with this organization, it is expected
that any unfair dealings will be avoided or rectified
by existing regulatory, legal, or
reputational measures.
A limitation of this approach to trust operationalization is that its utility is specific to the
interorganizational public-sector professional setting, where interactions tend to begin through and
follow bureaucratic lines of hierarchy and accountability. Hence, our construction of affinitive trust,
for example, leaned towards learned familiarity based on longer-term repeated interactions rather
than impressionistic rapport and value similarity likely more possible on an individual-to-individual
basis, or in an individual-versus-government setting. Trust scales operationalizing inter-personal
trust or intra-organizational trust (where survey question referents more likely to be people rather
than organizations) would likely need to adapt or design question sets different than the existing
trust questions (in Nootboom et al. [23] and Dietz and Den Hartog [24]) that Song et al. [3,13] and
Temby et al. [7,25] used. Noting the cumbersome nature of trust operationalization and the absence of
well-established trust scales, Song et al. [13] (p. 693) stated that “because the abstract construct of trust
needs to be contextualized to suit the specific characteristics of trustors and trustees, and also because
there exists multi-disciplinary interest in trust, reflected in the different theoretical assumptions leading
to varying empirical approaches, trust measurement has tended to be too idiosyncratic to enable
generalizations to other contexts”.
Influence is an important component of what Robert Agranoff [14] (p. 59-60) refers to as “mutual
learning and adaptation”. It is a way of measuring network functionality in attaining coordinated
activities. Three degrees of influence were measured in this survey, operationalizing Jinnah’s [19]
tripartite typology of interorganizational influence introduced in Post-Treaty Politics. To measure
interorganizational influence, respondents were asked about informational flow and availability
enhancements, changes in professional choices, and normative shifts in management paradigm.
Influence was measured on a three-point Likert scale (i.e., ‘never’; ‘occasionally’; and ‘regularly’ for
Sustainability 2019, 11, 6090 6 of 23
informational and behavioral change; ‘not at all’; ‘a little bit’; and ‘a great deal’ for normative change)
within the network (see Table 2).
Table 2. Operationalization of Three Types of Influence (Derived from Jinnah [19] (pp. 54–55)).
Type of Influence Survey Question
Change in flow and availability of information
How often has your communications with people from this
organization, or documentation from it, enhanced your knowledge
of fishery science or management?
Behavioral change not required by rules
How often has communicating with people in the following
organization led you to make professional choices or decisions that
you would not have otherwise made?
Change in norms
To what extent have your communications with people at this
organization led you to rethink your approach the management of
fisheries and/or harvesting and conservation practices?
2.2. Data Collection
Lists of organizations were drafted by asking scientists and fishery managers in the Gulf of Mexico
who they work with. This list was designed to be as inclusive as possible and included: two regional
interstate organizations, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council and the Gulf States Marine
Fishery Commission. Federal agencies included the National Marine Fishery Service, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S Department of Agriculture. All five
U.S. states also had relevant agencies (with Mississippi having two: Mississippi Department of Wildlife,
Fisheries & Parks and Mississippi Department of Marine Resources).
Four Mexican agencies were included, most notably SEMARNAT, CONAPESCA, and INAPESCA.
Relatively little research has examined U.S.–Mexican relations when dealing solely with fisheries, and it
is unknown what type of communication they have with American organizations. A few U.S.–Mexican
bilateral or trilateral organizations addressing environmental issues were also included.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) included the Environmental Defense Fund, charitable
organizations like The Nature Conservancy, and research-oriented organizations such as the Pew
Charitable Trusts. Some organizations in this category target solely marine resources (e.g., Ocean
Conservancy, Oceana). The overall goal of most of the identified NGOs is the preservation and
sustainability of marine resources. Although some, such as the Recreational Fishing Alliance, operate
as industrial trade groups.
The survey was distributed via email to members of 27 organizations using the Qualtrics survey
software. E-mail addresses were obtained from publicly available sources, such as online contact lists,
directories, and meeting records. In total, 3370 e-mail addresses were collected. Of these, 1749 were
from the U.S. Federal government, 257 belonged to state employees, 968 belonged to members of
Mexican organizations, 112 e-mail addresses belonged to bi- and tri-national organizations, and 284
addresses were for NGOs. A survey link generated through Qualtrics was also able to be shared
among those who were not e-mailed directly. Multiple reminder e-mails were sent at different time
intervals, and the survey was available in English and Spanish. 285 people provided responses to the
survey, of which 88 fully completed all questions, while 161 respondents provided partial information,
yielding data on 774 respondent-target organization dyads.
2.3. Analysis
The analysis encompassed descriptive and predictive procedures. Descriptive procedures were
used to indicate relative interorganizational influence and the presence of interorganizational trust
and communication type (formal and informal) among organizations within and across jurisdictions.
Predictive analysis was used to determine the effects of formal and informal communication and the
four kinds of trust on the three types of influence.
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Influence was calculated using four metrics, namely, the percent of respondent organizations that
reported communicating with each organization, and the average rating of each target organization by
each respondent for all three influence types. The influence scores were standardized on a 0–1 scale
and reported as a ratio of the total score for each organization divided by the number of organizations
that reported communicating with that organization.
Formal and informal communication patterns were analyzed using a form of network analysis.
The organizations with which respondents reported communicating were grouped into one of four
jurisdictional categories: the U.S. federal government, U.S. state wildlife and natural resource agencies,
regional organizations (specifically, the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission, the Gulf of Mexico
Alliance, and the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council), and NGOs. Mexican agencies were
excluded from the analysis because only one survey respondent was from a Mexican agency, and
because only six respondents reported communicating with agencies of the Mexican government.
The scores that each respondent assigned each organization for formal communication frequency and
informal communication frequency were standardized on a 0–1 scale and averaged across agencies
within each of the four jurisdictional categories.
The trust scores for each organization that respondents reported communicating with were
standardized on a −1 to 1 scale. Because the dispositional trust questions are worded negatively
(measuring dispositional distrust) they were reverse scored to make dispositional trust comparable
with the other trust types during analysis. The three dyadic trust measures (rational, affinitive,
and procedural trust) were then averaged across the organizations that each respondent reported
communicating with, grouped into the same four jurisdictional categories used for the communication
patterns analysis. The result is a jurisdictional score of each trust type for each respondent.
Hierarchical regression was employed as an analytical strategy showing the effects of the relevant
predictor variables (informal and formal communication, and the three dyadic trust types) after
accounting for respondent characteristics. This analytical approach is preferred when predictor
variables are correlated with each other and when the analysis aims to highlight the effects of a specific
set of predictor variables [26,27]. It involves the construction of individual predictive models consisting
of predictor sets of one or more variables and entering them into hierarchical regression models
sequentially, with each individual predictor set explaining variation not explained by the previously
entered models. The increment in variance in the dependent variable after each predictor set is entered
into the model is represented by the R2 change. The effect of individual predictors can also be assessed
using the standardized coefficients for each individual predictor entered into the predictor set and
overall model.
For the predictive analysis, three hierarchical regression models were constructed—one for each
dependent variable (influence defined as a change in available information, behavioral change, and
normative change). We controlled for variation among respondents’ jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
of the target agencies, and individual-level variation, with these predictor sets entered into the
hierarchical regression model before the independent variables. Participant and target organizations
were aggregated into six group types: (1) inter-jurisdictional United States; (2) U.S. federal; (3) U.S. states;
(4) Mexican government; (5) international organizations; and (6) non-governmental organizations.
Individual-level variation was important to control for because the structure of the data, whereby
each respondent selects among a list of organizations with which dyads are constructed, introduces a
repeated measures property. Rather than creating >100 dummy variables (one for each respondent),
we utilized criterion scaling, “an alternative approach for encoding predictors with a large number of
categories when analyzing data with repeated measures designs” [3] (p. 14) (cf. [7,28,29]). By calculating
each respondent’s mean score on the dependent variable as predictor values for all target organizations
she rated, a single predictor effectively identifies everyone (see Song et al., [3]).
Interaction variables were created between communication types and trust types because previous
research indicates that affinitive trust and informal communication exhibit an additive interaction on
interorganizational influence, while procedural trust and informal communication exhibit a negative
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interaction [3]. A total of eight interaction terms were created. Predictor sets were defined and entered
into each hierarchical model in a predetermined order using the following general logic: (1) control
variables, (2) independent variables, and (3) interactions [3]. The specific order and rationale are
described in Table 3.
Table 3. Logic for Hierarchical Regression Model Construction.
Predictor Sets in Order
Entered Logic for Ordering of Predictor Set
Informational
Change
Behavioral
Change
Normative
Change
Participant Organization
Type (5 dummy-coded
variables)
Codes the most general way of classifying survey
participants by type of organization they work for,
irrespective of target organization they relate to.
1 1 1
Dispositional Distrust (DT)
Reflects “the general tendency or predisposition of
an individual to trust or distrust another entity in a
particular context” [12] (p. 122). Based on innate
tendencies or personal histories.
2 2 2
Criterion-scaled Participants
predictor
Codes individual participants to control for
individual differences in rating relationships with
individual agencies.
3 3 3
Target Organization Type (5
dummy-coded variables)
Codes the type of the specific organization that is a
target for trust development and communications
for an individual participant.
4 4 4
Frequency of Informal
Communication (FI)
Assesses how frequently the individual participant
informally communicates with a specific target
organization. An antecedent of trust [30].
5 5 5
Frequency of Formal
Communication (FF)
Given that informal communication frequency has
been accounted for, assesses how frequently the
individual participant formally communicates with a
specific target organization.
6 6 6
Rational Trust component
(RT)
Based on “trustors’ evaluations about what they
believe will be the likely outcomes of potential
trustees’ likely actions.” Transactional, based on
perceived utility, and “grounded in perceptions of
competence, predictability, past performance, and
perceived alignment of goals” [31] (p. 104).
7 7 7
Procedural Trust component
(PT)
Assesses trust in the procedures underpinning a
relationship with a specific target organization that
decrease vulnerability of the trustor. Presumably a
precursor to building an interorganizational
relationship (see [32]). In our formulation, based on
assessments of fairness in past experiences with the
target organization.
8 8 8
Affinitive Trust component
(AT)
Assesses the level of affinitive trust associated with a
specific target organization, built up over a duration
and “based primarily on the emotions and
associated judgments resulting from either cognitive
or subconscious assessments of the qualities of the
potential trustee [12] (p. 122).
9 9 9
Trust Component
Interactions I (FI*DT, FI*PT,
FI*RT, and FI*AT)
2-way interactions between trust components and
frequency of informal communication, entered after
the relevant main effects have been accounted for.
10 10 10
Trust Component
Interactions II (FF*DT, FF*PT,
FF*RT, and RC*FF)
2-way interactions between trust components and
frequency of formal communication, entered after
the relevant main effects have been accounted for.
11 11 11
Informational Influence
Assesses the impact on individual participant’s
change in knowledge, after trust has been
established and frequency of informal and formal
communication has been accounted for [19].
DV – –
Behavioral Influence
Assesses the impact of formal communication on
individual participant’s own choices and decision
making, after trust has been established and
frequency of informal and formal communication
has been accounted for [19].
– DV –
Normative Influence
Assesses the impact of all types of trust and both
informal and formal communication on rules and
norms underpinning behavior [19].
– – DV
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3. Results
3.1. Respondent Profile
Table 4 shows the five organizations with the highest number of survey respondents. There were
a high number of federal and state respondents, and fewer NGO respondents. The survey received
only single response from the four surveyed Mexican natural resource agencies.
Table 4. Highest Respondent Rates by Organization.
Organization Category Percent of Respondents
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Federal 18.4%
National Marine Fishery Service Federal 11.7%
U.S. Geological Survey Federal 10.4%
Mississippi Department of Marine Resources State 7.4%
Coastal Conservation Association NGO 7.4%
Time working within an organization relates to the amount of turnover within some positions in
the management network. Higher turnover rates may result in less interorganizational connectivity
since there is less time to cultivate meaningful professional partnerships with other organizations.
Nearly half of the respondents (40.88%) had spent over 15 years working within their organization
(Figure 1).
Figure 1. Time working within organization.
The majority of respondents were based within closer proximity to the Gulf of Mexico coastline,
with most coming from organizations in Mississippi and Florida. Some organizations, such as the
Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission, do not have satellite offices, but only have a single address.
The commission is located in Gulfport, MS. In conjunction with this, the Mississippi Department of
Marine Resources also contributes to the density of respondents within the area. The only response
received from a Mexican organization reported an area code within the United States.
A relatively even distribution of different types of fishery were selected by respondents when
asked which fish species related to their work. Reef fish, including the economically important red
snapper, was the highest selected fish type. Groupers and other reef fish also remain very high among
respondents. In the ‘Other (Indicate below)’ options, the most frequently entered answers were oysters
and endangered and threatened species (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Species of management focus reported by respondents.
3.2. Presence and Distribution of Influence, Communication, and Trust
Figure 3 displays the influence scores for the 13 organizations for which 25% or more of the
respondents from other organizations reported communicating with. The organizations are arrayed
left to right, in order of descending informational influence scores. Overall, informational influence
was reported as being the most prevalent between organizations, followed by normative influence and
behavioral influence.
Figure 3. Influential organizations in the Gulf of Mexico fishery.
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Respondents indicated that NOAA Fisheries, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, and the Gulf
Council were the federal and regional organizations with which they most commonly communicate
(see “Percent Communicating” in Figure 4). NOAA Fisheries and the Gulf Council, arguably the two
most important regulatory organizations for Gulf fisheries, were considered highly influential by our
sample. Only 35% of respondents reported communicating with the interstate fishery commission,
yet it was rated as influential by those that did, especially in terms of informational influence. This is
consistent with the common practice of fishery commissions to specialize as facilitators of knowledge
exchange. The state agencies also scored high in communication, especially Louisiana’s and Florida’s
fishery agencies. While their communication scores were similar, Louisiana was considered the most
influential by respondents from other organizations.
The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is an interjurisdictional collaborative organization created by the state
governments with the mandate of implementing ecosystem-based management in the Gulf of Mexico.
It has strategically avoided hot-button issues like fisheries in favor of less contentious opportunities to
promote the shared stewardship of the Gulf’s ecosystem [11]. Its modest reported influence in our
dataset, when compared to other regional organizations that have an explicit fishery focus (like the
Gulf Council and Gulf Commission), is a likely outcome of its scope.
Figure 4 presents the reported interjurisdictional communication patterns in the Gulf of Maine
fishery management network, showing: a) the Formal Communication Intensity (FCI); and b) the
Informal Communication Intensity (ICI) across jurisdictional categories. The width of the arrows is
proportional to the reported level of interjurisdictional communicative intensity, while the percent of
respondents from each jurisdictional category communicating with the category to which each arrow
points is indicated by a percent communicating (PC) score, also indicated by the darkness of each
arrow’s shading. The arrows pointing to the respondent jurisdictional category indicates the reported
within-jurisdiction interagency communication (for example, between different federal agencies).
The results highlight the centrality of the U.S. state agencies in the sampled communication network.
As indicated by the PC scores, respondents from all jurisdictions other than state agencies reported
communicating with state agencies more than with organizations from other jurisdictional categories.
U.S. federal agencies were also prominent in the network. Respondents from interjurisdictional regional
organizations reported higher levels of communication with other jurisdictions than respondents
from the U.S. federal and state agencies reported communicating with them. Overall, the total FCI
reported between each jurisdictional category was generally higher than the level of ICI reported,
particularly for the interjurisdictional regional organizations (total FCI = 0.59; ICI = 0.51) and NGOs
(FCI = 0.54; ICI = 0.47). Respondents from federal and state agencies reported communicating with the
regional organizations and NGOs through formal channels more than through informal avenues. The
scores also show that the respondents from state agencies communicate with each other formally more
than informally.
The four trust dimensions are presented in Figure 5 using the same four jurisdictional categories.
Dispositional trust had the lowest presence in the network, averaging −0.076 across all respondents.
Procedural trust, affinitive trust and rational trust scored 0.027, 0.030, and 0.395, respectively. When
distinguishing by respondent jurisdiction, respondents from regional interjurisdictional organizations
and the U.S. federal government reported having the highest levels of trust toward other organizations.
The relatively high levels of rational trust, compared to procedural trust (substantially lower levels
of procedural trust than Song et al. [3] report in the Great Lakes fishery network) is particularly
notable (Figure 5a). It suggests a network with relatively low levels of trust in institutional safeguards
and a high level of transactional interaction. Respondents from NGOs reported the lowest levels of
procedural trust overall.
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Interjurisdictional measurements of trust were also compared. Figure 5b contains heat maps for
the three interorganizational trust dimensions, showing how respondents from organizations in each
of the four jurisdictions rated the others from those jurisdictions. The rows show the scores reported
by the respondents in their respective jurisdictional category. Columns reveal the scores assigned
to organizations in that jurisdictional category. The data indicates that the state agencies were the
most trusted organizations by the sample of respondents from the fishery network. Even respondents
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from NGOs, which were the lowest trusting group, reported trusting state agencies as much as
the respondents from other agencies did. The highest rational and affinitive trust scores were
observed between the three organizations grouped into the ‘interjurisdictional’ category (0.49 and 0.31,
respectively)—the interstate fishery commission, the Gulf Council, and the Gulf of Mexico Alliance.
For this reason, the comparably low procedural trust score reported between the respondents from
these organizations (0.07), and towards them by organizations in other jurisdictional categories (except
U.S. federal employees) (0.00 from respondents in state government; −0.27 by respondents in NGOs),
is notable. It suggests that participants from several organizations, across jurisdictions, accept that
they must deal with these interjurisdictional organizations, yet view their interactions as occurring in a
context that potentially lacks clear rules guaranteeing fairness.
Figure 5. Trust by respondent jurisdiction (a) and between jurisdictions (b).
3.3. Effect of Trust and Communication on Influence
The results of the three hierarchical regression models (one predicting each type of influence) are
presented in Figure 6a–c. The left column lists the individual predictors comprising the predictor sets
(listed in Table 3), with the predictor sets separated by dotted lines. For each hierarchical regression
analysis, only the significant predictors (alpha = 0.05) are reported. Because all predictor sets have a
cumulative effect on explaining variation, the R2 change resulting from each is reported. The number
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above the arrow for each predictor is the standardized beta coefficient. The R2 reported for each
dependent variable is the total variation explained by each model. A fuller presentation of the results
of the three models is presented in the Appendix A below, in Tables A1–A3.
Figure 6a (and Table A1 in the Appendix A) presents the effect of predictor variables for influence
defined as a change in flow or availability of information between network members. After controlling
for participant jurisdiction, dispositional trust, the criterion-scaled participants, and target organization,
three independent variables had a significant effect on this type of interorganizational influence. The
frequency of both formal and informal communication between network members predicts influence
through enhancing an organization’s knowledge of fishery science or management. Neither affinitive
trust nor procedural trust predicted this type of influence. Only rational trust, based on the perceived
utility of another organization, was found to have an effect. Furthermore, rational trust and formal
communication frequency exhibited a negative interaction. Higher formal communication frequency
was associated with an attenuated effect of rational trust on informational influence.
Figure 6. Cont.
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Figure 6. Summary of significant hierarchical regression relationships for predicting impact on
(a) informational change; (b) behavioral change; and (c) normative change. The hierarchical predictor
sets are separated by short dotted lines and the change in R2 associated with the addition of that
predictor set to each regression model is shown in solid-line boxes. Note: N=105 respondents; n=774
Target Agency ratings; contribution of predictor set shown as ∆R2; path coefficients are standardized
regression coefficients; only significant (p < 0.05) relationships are shown.
Figure 6b (and Table A2 in the Appendix A) presents the significant results of the hierarchical
regression predicting the impact of trust and formal and informal communication to bring about
influence defined as behavioral change. After controlling for participant organization type, dispositional
trust, and target jurisdiction, three independent variables had a significant effect on moderate
interorganizational influence. As for informational influence, both formal and informal communication
frequency predicted behavioral influence, with informal exhibiting a larger effect than formal
communication. However, here, the effect of informal communication is stronger than for informational
influence, and the effect of formal communication is weaker. Rational trust impacts behavioral influence,
but its effect is weaker than it is for informational influence.
Figure 6c (and Table A3 in the Appendix A) presents the hierarchical regression results for
predicting the impacts of trust and communication on interorganizational influence defined as a
change in norms. After accounting for the participants’ organization types, dispositional trust, and the
organization types, four independent variables are significant predictors. As with the other influence
types, formal and informal communication have an effect, with the impact of informal communication
stronger. Rational trust and affinitive trust show a similar degree of impact on normative influence.
Also notable is the effect of dispositional distrust, which was roughly equal to rational and affinitive
trust. In addition, two interaction effects are significant. Informal communication frequency interacts
with rational trust negatively and affinitive trust positively. In other words, increases in informal
communication frequency were associated with an attenuated effect for rational trust and an enhanced
effect for affinitive trust on normative influence.
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4. Discussion
This article has utilized a survey of participants in the public management network for the
Gulf of Mexico fishery to examine interorganizational influence, and the presence and effects of its
antecedents. Our purpose was to understand some of the social factors affecting interorganizational
exchange, cooperation, and collaboration within a complex, multi-actor transboundary natural resource
management context. The antecedents measured and examined for their impact on interorganizational
influence represent the “mortar” that Wondolleck and Yaffee [11] consider indispensable for marine
ecosystem-based management, and for which considerable recent attention in the NRM literature has
been devoted: multidimensional trust and informal and formal interorganizational communication.
In doing so, the case study analysis also yielded insight to the diverse composition of the Gulf of
Mexico fishery management network, which has not previously been examined in this way. The overall
view of the management network obtained by examining the presence and distribution of influence,
communication, and trust, is a network in which influence is concentrated mostly within two federal
agencies, the two interjurisdictional regional agencies, and the state agencies charged with fishery
management. NGOs were less often communicated with by respondents from other organizations
and respondents from NGO were generally less trusting of other organizations. Influence through the
provision of information was more common than influence through the changing of norms or behavior,
formal communication was more prevalent than informal communication, and rational trust was more
common than the other types.
The findings paint a picture of a network that is fragmented and transactional. Although network
members seek to manage a transboundary network, our sample of respondents reported operating
through a federal-state and inter-state network that did not extend beyond the U.S.–Mexican border.
Influence within our sample is concentrated in a small number of agencies, including the main federal
and regional regulators (especially NOAA Fisheries and the Gulf Council) and state agencies. Most
surprising is the relatively minor role in the network attributed to the Gulf of Mexico Alliance. While
this may be the result of limitations associated with our partial and purposive sample of survey
respondents, we were expecting it to play a more significant role in the network based on the work of
Wondolleck and Yaffee [11] who associate it with the successful implementation of EBM in the Gulf of
Mexico. Within our sample of network actors, it appears that the potential coordinating role of the Gulf
of Mexico Alliance remains ceded to the interstate fishery commission which, despite having a small
staff of two-dozen and a miniscule budget compared to the others, was found to exercise considerable
influence due to its official status and expertise.
The predictive findings indicate that informal communication is more consequential in
interorganizational influence than formal communication (as indicated by higher standardized
regression coefficients and R2 change, although both are statistically significant across all models), and
that rational trust is the most impactful, while procedural trust has no observed effect. The findings
also indicate that the effects of interorganizational trust and communication differ based on the type of
influence they facilitate.
Interorganizational influence defined as a change in information flow and availability was
impacted by rational trust only. Although informal communication displayed a stronger effect than
formal communication, the size of the differential was smaller than in other forms of interorganizational
influence. This outcome is intuitive, since information and knowledge in a management setting is
inherently rational. However, it has more significant implications. Trust is often described as important
for lubricating the network ‘transmission lines’ for facilitating knowledge flow [14,33–36]. This is one of
the most important roles of networks, and rationales for their existence, in natural resource management.
The fact that only one dimension of trust—based not on belief in the fairness of bureaucratic procedures,
nor on the relational comfort of a long-standing professional relationship—exhibited an effect has
implications for how we understand network influence within transboundary natural resource
management settings. In certain interorganizational contexts, rational trust may be a medium of
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technocratic power. This is the type of influence described by Barnett and Finnemore [37], whereby
organizations seen as authorities with specialized knowledge exercise a narrow form of influence.
The findings were similar for behavioral influence. Rational trust was the only trust shown to
impact interorganizational influence. This finding is similar to Song et al.’s [3] study of the Great Lakes
fisheries governance network, which reported no effect of either dispositional trust or procedural
trust on behavioral influence, and the larger role for informal communication relative to formal
communication observed in this model.
For normative influence (arguably the deepest form), dispositional, affinitive, and rational trust
were all significant predictors. Unlike with the other forms of influence, changes in a respondent’s
general approach to fishery management were facilitated by the existence of longstanding working
relationships and associated emotional closeness with the influencing organization. While rational
trust also had an impact on normative influence, the difference between its effect and the other
two significant trust types was minimal. The effect of dispositional distrust was anticipated by
Smith and colleagues [38] (p.16) who found a negative relationship between dispositional trust and
participation in resource management planning with government agencies. These authors called for
studies examining the “potential importance distrust plays in fueling public involvement in resource
planning and management”. The present study represents a tentative step in showing the importance
of dispositional distrust as a motivating force for influence within interorganizational natural resource
management networks.
Given the prevalent network properties that depict a transactional management network (low
presence of affinitive and procedural trust, relatively high levels of rational trust, higher presence
of formal communication than informal communication), it may seem impressive that so many
respondents reported being influenced by their interactions with other organizations. Here, Stern and
Baird’s [10] concept of trust ecology merits consideration. They argue that, in the absence of certain
types of trust, other types may ‘buffer’ by substituting. When procedural trust is lacking (as appears
the case in the Gulf of Mexico fishery network), “Rational and/or affinitive trust between people or
for an organization can allow groups to move forward and directly address system changes together
through social and/or organizational learning” [10] (p.3). Affinitive trust’s role in facilitating normative
influence in the absence of procedural trust is particularly important given the low levels of affinitive
trust measured among survey participants towards the organizations they reported interacting with.
Further evidence of such ‘buffering’ can be found in the three significant interaction variables.
In the models for informational influence and normative influence, communication frequency negatively
interacted with rational trust. Communication frequency is a well-established dimension of social
capital [15]. The results suggest that, when communication frequency is low, rational trust’s larger
effect on interorganizational influence can buffer against poorly developed relationships, enabling
mutual learning and adaptation in spite of relatively low levels of interaction. Song et al. [3] found
procedural trust to have a similar buffering effect on conflict reduction (not examined in this study).
Affinitive trust’s positive interaction with informal communication frequency is consistent with
Temby’s [7] and Song et al.’s [3] findings about this trust type’s effect on interorganizational influence.
In addition to exhibiting an independent effect on normative influence, its presence is associated with
a stronger effect of informal communication frequency.
These findings suggest at least two potentially fruitful avenues for further research. First, given
the importance of trust on interorganizational influence, research is needed on the managerial strategies
and control mechanisms used to facilitate interorganizational trust in the NRM context and to mitigate
the perception of risk stemming from working together (cf. [2]). A growing literature exists on risk
perception and control in inter-firm strategic alliances [39–43]. The control mechanisms used in NRM
(e.g., interagency strategic vision statements, incentives for informal interaction) are often different
than those employed in the private sector, and their effects on trust development are under-researched.
It should be possible for future research to identify which types of control mechanism in use serve to
develop, and presuppose, different trust types.
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Second, and related, further research could examine the activities of network boundary-spanning
leadership on multi-type influence [30]. Coleman and Stern [5] call boundary-spanning leaders trust
ambassadors. However, is their influence more in the realm of weak and technocratic (informational
change) influence, or does it extend to changes in basic ways of thinking about problems? This is an
important question when considering the problem of inclusion of diverse interests in EBM, which
must contend with who to involve (and build trust with and influence) and who to exclude due to
the risk that some actors have values that are too discordant with the network’s objectives and will
not be able to be won over. In a multiple-case comparison of U.S. EBM initiatives, Judith Layzer [44]
described the failures of EBM initiatives to build trust with participants who do not have shared values
underpinning their activities. If boundary-spanning leadership is more effective at influence through
information, rather than shared identity and purpose building and altering, for example, the advisable
stakeholder engagement strategies to be employed should potentially be considered accordingly.
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Appendix A Full Hierarchical Regression Results
For each hierarchical regression analysis, the model summary table and predictor-specific
coefficients are reported. The summary of the model building process shows that all predictor sets
entered contributed significantly to the model indicating that the inclusion of these variables is
statistically meaningful compared to a model that does not include them. For each individual predictor,
both unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients as well as the part correlation are listed;
the square of the part correlation is also reported (identified as the squared semi-partial correlation,
sr2), which reflects the proportion of variance that the predictor uniquely explains in the dependent
variable over and above all previously entered predictors.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 6090 19 of 23
Table A1. Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Informational Change.
Hierarchical regression model summary a
R2 change statistics
Model Predictor set entered Model R2 R2 Change df predictors df residual F-test P
1 Participant’s Agency 0.0314 0.0314 4 732 5.93 0.0001
2 Dispositional Distrust (DT) 0.0489 0.0175 5 591 6.07 0.0000
3 Criterion-scaled Participants 0.3164 0.2675 6 590 45.51 0.0000
4 Target Agency 0.3990 0.0826 10 586 38.90 0.0000
5 Frequency of Informal Communication 0.4769 0.0779 11 575 47.66 0.0000
6 Frequency of formal Communication 0.4995 0.0226 12 562 46.75 0.0000
7 Rational Trust Component (RT) 0.5162 0.0167 13 529 43.41 0.0000
8 Procedural Trust Component (PT) 0.5148 −0.0014 14 495 37.52 0.0000
9 Affinity Trust Component (AT) 0.5154 0.0006 15 494 35.02 0.0000
10 Trust Interactions (FI×DT, FI×PT, FI×RT, and FI×AT) 0.5191 0.0037 19 490 27.84 0.0000
11 Trust Interactions (FF×DT, FF×PT, FF×RT, and FF×AT) 0.5265 0.0074 23 486 23.50 0.0000
Model coefficients
Unstandardized coefficients Standardizedcoefficients Correlations F-test
Model Individual predictor β Std. error β Part sr2 P
1 Participant’s Agency: Interjurisdictional U.S. 0.1951 0.0752 0.1198 0.0944 0.0089 0.0097
Participant’s Agency: U.S. Federal −0.0507 0.0652 −0.0388 −0.0283 0.0008 0.4371
Participant’s Agency: U.S. States −0.0895 0.0664 −0.0667 −0.0490 0.0024 0.1780
Participant’s Agency: Mexican Government 0.7185 0.3557 0.0741 0.0735 0.0054 0.0438
Participant’s Agency: International Organizations - - - - - -
2 Dispositional Distrust (DT) −0.0340 0.0368 −0.0388 −0.0371 0.0014 0.3549
3 Criterion-scaled Participants 0.9913 0.0652 0.5603 0.5172 0.2675 0.0000
4 Target Agency: Interjurisdictional U.S. 0.5128 0.0708 0.2655 0.2320 0.0538 0.0000
Target Agency: U.S. Federal 0.2928 0.0537 0.2168 0.1747 0.0305 0.0000
Target Agency: U.S. States 0.4023 0.0522 0.3058 0.2469 0.0610 0.0000
Target Agency: Mexican Government 0.0970 0.1748 0.0213 0.0178 0.0003 0.5793
Target Agency: International Organizations - - - - - -
5 Frequency of Informal Communication 0.2677 0.0297 0.2973 0.2719 0.0740 0.0000
6 Frequency of formal Communication 0.1749 0.0341 0.1793 0.1530 0.0234 0.0000
7 Rational Trust Component (RT) 0.1457 0.0289 0.1666 0.1527 0.0233 0.0000
8 Procedural Trust Component (PT) −0.0110 0.0332 −0.0143 −0.0104 0.0001 0.7398
9 Affinity Trust Component (AT) 0.0273 0.0369 0.0330 0.0231 0.0005 0.4605
10 FI×DT −0.0577 0.0515 −0.0394 −0.0351 0.0012 0.2625
FI×PT 0.0444 0.0459 0.0437 0.0303 0.0009 0.3333
FI×RT −0.0651 0.0517 −0.0579 −0.0394 0.0016 0.2086
FI×AT −0.0117 0.0491 −0.0106 −0.0075 0.0001 0.8118
11 FF×DT 0.0437 0.0522 0.0299 0.0261 0.0007 0.4028
FF×PT 0.0469 0.0575 0.0359 0.0254 0.0006 0.4153
FF×RT −0.1649 0.0648 −0.1112 −0.0794 0.0063 0.0113
FF×AT 0.0199 0.0627 0.0145 0.0099 0.0001 0.7513
a Dependent variable: Weak Influence. Note. Bold font gives us statistically significant predictors and values.
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Table A2. Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Behavioral Influence.
Hierarchical regression model summary a
R2 change statistics
Model Predictor set entered Model R2 R2 Change df predictors df residual F-test P
1 Participant’s Agency 0.0665 0.0665 4 735 13.08 0.0000
2 Dispositional Distrust (DT) 0.0903 0.0238 5 529 11.76 0.0000
3 Criterion-scaled Participants 0.4774 0.3871 6 591 89.97 0.0000
4 Target Agency 0.5235 0.0461 10 587 64.50 0.0000
5 Frequency of Informal Communication 0.6175 0.0940 11 578 84.84 0.0000
6 Frequency of formal Communication 0.6221 0.0046 12 565 77.52 0.0000
7 Rational Trust Component (RT) 0.6355 0.0134 13 531 71.21 0.0000
8 Procedural Trust Component (PT) 0.6383 0.0028 14 499 62.90 0.0000
9 Affinity Trust Component (AT) 0.6400 0.0017 15 498 59.01 0.0000
10 Trust Interactions (FI×DT, FI×PT, FI×RT, and FI×AT) 0.6424 0.0024 19 494 46.71 0.0000
11 Trust Interactions (FF×DT, FF×PT, FF×RT, and FF×AT) 0.6432 0.0008 23 490 38.41 0.0000
Model coefficients
Unstandardized coefficients Standardizedcoefficients Correlations F-test
Model Individual predictor β Std. error β Part sr2 P
1 Participant’s Agency: Interjurisdictional U.S. 0.2774 0.0811 0.1549 0.1219 0.0149 0.0007
Participant’s Agency: U.S. Federal −0.0022 0.0701 −0.0016 −0.0011 0.0000 0.9746
Participant’s Agency: U.S. States −0.1946 0.0711 −0.1337 −0.0975 0.0095 0.0064
Participant’s Agency: Mexican Government 1.1504 0.3809 0.1086 0.1076 0.0116 0.0026
Participant’s Agency: International Organizations - - - - - -
2 Dispositional Distrust (DT) 0.0410 0.0388 0.0432 0.0414 0.0017 0.2911
3 Criterion-scaled Participants 1.0002 0.0478 0.6904 0.6221 0.3870 0.0000
4 Target Agency: Interjurisdictional U.S. 0.2626 0.0679 0.1258 0.1102 0.0121 0.0001
Target Agency: U.S. Federal 0.2147 0.0515 0.1468 0.1188 0.0141 0.0000
Target Agency: U.S. States 0.3150 0.0499 0.2215 0.1798 0.0323 0.0000
Target Agency: Mexican Government −0.4800 0.1791 −0.0928 −0.0764 0.0058 0.0076
Target Agency: International Organizations - - - - - -
5 Frequency of Informal Communication 0.3270 0.0272 0.3362 0.3093 0.0957 0.0000
6 Frequency of formal Communication 0.1100 0.0309 0.1054 0.0921 0.0085 0.0004
7 Rational Trust Component (RT) 0.1107 0.0271 0.1169 0.1071 0.0115 0.0001
8 Procedural Trust Component (PT) 0.0048 0.0314 0.0058 0.0041 0.0000 0.8781
9 Affinity Trust Component (AT) 0.0531 0.0349 0.0592 0.0410 0.0017 0.1282
10 FI×DT −0.0379 0.0482 −0.0238 −0.0212 0.0004 0.4318
FI×PT 0.0229 0.0421 0.0207 0.0146 0.0002 0.5865
FI×RT −0.0195 0.0477 −0.0160 −0.0110 0.0001 0.6822
FI×AT 0.0417 0.0456 0.0348 0.0246 0.0006 0.3604
11 FF×DT 0.0208 0.0492 0.0131 0.0114 0.0001 0.6725
FF×PT 0.0236 0.0542 0.0167 0.0118 0.0001 0.6631
FF×RT −0.0590 0.0609 −0.0367 −0.0261 0.0007 0.3337
FF×AT 0.0197 0.0590 0.0132 0.0090 0.0001 0.7389
a Dependent variable: Weak Influence. Note. Bold font gives us statistically significant predictors and values.
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Table A3. Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Normative Influence.
Hierarchical regression model summary a
R2 change statistics
Model Predictor set entered Model R2 R2 Change df predictors df residual F-test P
1 Participant’s Agency 0.0479 0.0479 4 738 9.28 0.0000
2 Dispositional Distrust (DT) 0.0722 0.0243 5 597 9.30 0.0000
3 Criterion-scaled Participants 0.4084 0.3362 6 596 68.57 0.0000
4 Target Agency 0.4653 0.0569 10 592 51.51 0.0000
5 Frequency of Informal Communication 0.5490 0.0837 11 580 64.17 0.0000
6 Frequency of formal Communication 0.5625 0.0135 12 567 60.74 0.0000
7 Rational Trust Component (RT) 0.5890 0.0265 13 533 58.76 0.0000
8 Procedural Trust Component (PT) 0.5978 0.0088 14 499 52.97 0.0000
9 Affinity Trust Component (AT) 0.6078 0.0100 15 498 51.44 0.0000
10 Trust Interactions (FI×DT, FI×PT, FI×RT, and FI×AT) 0.6191 0.0113 19 494 42.26 0.0000
11 Trust Interactions (FF×DT, FF×PT, FF×RT, and FF×AT) 0.6233 0.0042 23 490 35.25 0.0000
Model coefficients
Unstandardized coefficients Standardizedcoefficients Correlations F-test
Model Individual predictor β Std. error β Part sr2 P
1 Participant’s Agency: Interjurisdictional U.S. 0.3921 0.0832 0.2153 0.1693 0.0287 0.0000
Participant’s Agency: U.S. Federal 0.1927 0.0722 0.1317 0.0958 0.0092 0.0078
Participant’s Agency: U.S. States 0.0484 0.0734 0.0324 0.0237 0.0006 0.5092
Participant’s Agency: Mexican Government 1.2370 0.3943 0.1137 0.1127 0.0127 0.0018
Participant’s Agency: International Organizations - - - - - -
2 Dispositional Distrust (DT) 0.1344 0.0403 0.1372 0.1315 0.0173 0.0009
3 Criterion-scaled Participants 1.0022 0.0545 0.6355 0.5798 0.3362 0.0000
4 Target Agency: Interjurisdictional U.S. 0.3562 0.0741 0.1650 0.1446 0.0209 0.0000
Target Agency: U.S. Federal 0.2076 0.0559 0.1377 0.1115 0.0124 0.0002
Target Agency: U.S. States 0.3909 0.0542 0.2670 0.2166 0.0469 0.0000
Target Agency: Mexican Government −0.2288 0.1831 −0.0448 −0.0376 0.0014 0.2118
Target Agency: International Organizations - - - - - -
5 Frequency of Informal Communication 0.3122 0.0303 0.3122 0.2873 0.0826 0.0000
6 Frequency of formal Communication 0.1296 0.0349 0.1193 0.1033 0.0107 0.0002
7 Rational Trust Component (RT) 0.1720 0.0300 0.1748 0.1589 0.0253 0.0000
8 Procedural Trust Component (PT) 0.0196 0.0347 0.0225 0.0161 0.0003 0.5720
9 Affinity Trust Component (AT) 0.1327 0.0372 0.1415 0.1000 0.0100 0.0004
10 FI×DT −0.0449 0.0515 −0.0269 −0.0242 0.0006 0.3841
FI×PT 0.0636 0.0456 0.0551 0.0387 0.0015 0.1638
FI×RT −0.1448 0.0515 −0.1135 −0.0781 0.0061 0.0051
FI×AT 0.1270 0.0492 0.1013 0.0717 0.0051 0.0101
11 FF×DT 0.0872 0.0527 0.0525 0.0459 0.0021 0.0986
FF×PT 0.0179 0.0580 0.0121 0.0085 0.0001 0.7584
FF×RT −0.0752 0.0659 −0.0448 −0.0317 0.0010 0.2541
FF×AT 0.0876 0.0634 0.0564 0.0383 0.0015 0.1680
a Dependent variable: Weak Influence. Note. Bold font gives us statistically significant predictors and values.
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